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Abstract
This paper contributes to the literature providing indirect evidence for proﬁt
shifting within multinational companies. In contrast to the previous studies we
account for the tax responsiveness of the capital stock and analyse the impact of
corporate taxes on both pre- and post-tax proﬁtability. Evidence from our large
panel dataset of European subsidiaries supports the proﬁt shifting hypothesis.
We ﬁnd that a 10 percentage point decrease in the tax rate increases post-tax
proﬁtability by up to 1.1 percentage points. Further, our results suggest that
ﬁnancial proﬁts and losses are particularly responsive to taxes, which indicates
that a large part of proﬁt shifting takes places via debt shifting.
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1 Introduction
Policy makers have been concerned about diﬀerences in corporate tax rates world-
wide for some time, because these diﬀerences create incentives for multinational
companies to move real activity to countries with lower taxes. Furthermore, even
if multinationals do not move real capital in response to tax diﬀerentials, they may
shift income to low-tax countries, by manipulating the geographical distribution of
their taxable proﬁts. Multinational groups can shift income among aﬃliates resi-
dent in diﬀerent countries in two main ways, namely through transfer pricing, i.e.
strategic mispricing of internal transactions, and through debt shifting, i.e. ﬁnancial
transactions between aﬃliated subsidiaries. Although policy makers are targeting
such strategies by setting limits to intra-ﬁrm borrowing and lending and by apply-
ing the arm's length principle in intra-group trade, there is widespread belief that
multinationals succeed in transferring proﬁts via tax planning.
Proﬁt shifting activities by multinational companies have been in the focus of
a growing empirical literature. For example Huizinga and Laeven (2008) and We-
ichenrieder (2009) investigate the eﬀects of corporate taxes on proﬁt levels. While
this provides indirect evidence for proﬁt shifting, the proﬁts level might at the same
time be aﬀected by tax-induced relocation of capital. Therefore we extend the work
of Grubert and Mutti (1991) and model the eﬀects of taxes on proﬁtability, deﬁned
as the ratio of proﬁts over assets. However, in order to derive empirically testable
predictions about proﬁtability one should look at capital movements as well as at
proﬁt movements. In our model we show that in the absence of proﬁt shifting pre-tax
proﬁtability should be positively associated with corporate tax rates, whereas post-
tax proﬁtability should be equalised across countries. If, on the other hand, proﬁt
shifting is important, then post-tax proﬁtability will be unambiguously negatively
associated with the tax rate.
We use a large sample consisting of 253,106 observations on 39,110 ﬁrms from
2002-2009 from the Amadeus dataset to test our theoretical predictions. Our results
favour the proﬁt shifting hypothesis over the non-proﬁt shifting hypothesis. The
ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects estimates show that a 10 percentage point increase in the tax rate
decreases post-tax proﬁtability between 0.6 and 1.1 percentage points depending on
the measure of proﬁt used. Proﬁt measures including ﬁnancial proﬁts and losses,
most notably interest deductions are more responsive to tax rate changes, which
indicates that proﬁt shifting is to a large extent done via debt shifting. This ﬁnding
is strengthened by the large inﬂuence of debt on reported proﬁtability.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a short
review of related literature. Section 3 develops a stylized theoretical model to moti-
vate the empirical estimation. Section 4 describes the data, and Section 5 presents
and discusses the results and some robustness analysis. Section 6 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Empirical proﬁt shifting literature can be broadly distinguished into studies provid-
ing direct and indirect evidence. Direct evidence in this context refers to the fact
that a speciﬁc channel of proﬁt shifting, i.e. debt shifting or transfer pricing, is
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analyzed. In contrast, indirect evidence describes the approach where the outcome
of proﬁt shifting, i.e. tax induced diﬀerences in proﬁts, is interpreted as evidence
for the existence of proﬁt shifting. Whereas studies providing direct evidence can
shed more light on the diﬀerent channels of proﬁt shifting and rule out some alterna-
tive explanations, these studies typically demand more detailed data on intra-group
transactions.1 More importantly, direct evidence for proﬁt shifting by its nature
analyses only particular aspects of proﬁt shifting, and therefore can never capture
the full impact of taxation on proﬁt shifting activities. We therefore follow the strand
of literature providing indirect evidence for proﬁt shifting.2
The earliest study directly related to our approach is Grubert and Mutti (1991).
They use country level aggregate data for foreign aﬃliates of US parents and ﬁnd
strong evidence of a negative relationship between the statutory corporate tax rate
and post-tax proﬁtability. Similarly Hines and Rice (1994) use country-level aggre-
gate data of US non-bank aﬃliates for a larger set of host countries including tax
havens. Analysing the proﬁt levels in the host countries a one percentage point
higher host country tax rate is associated with a reduction of reported proﬁts by
3 percent. In a more recent paper, Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003) suggest that
proﬁt-shifting activity is also signiﬁcant within the OECD countries. Using industry
level aggregate data they disentangle the eﬀects of proﬁt shifting from changes in
productivity and real economic activity.
More recent contributions make increasingly use of ﬁrm level data. Two early
studies are motivated by the observation of near zero proﬁtability of foreign-controlled
US domestic corporations. Collins et. al. (1997) use data from the wholesale sector
but fail to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in proﬁtability between domestically and for-
eign owned companies. Grubert (1997) ﬁnds a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in proﬁtability,
however, the eﬀect vanishes over time and can not be attributed to proﬁt shifting.
In contrast Mintz and Smart (2004) ﬁnd evidence for proﬁt shifting using Canadian
data. The identiﬁcation strategy of Mintz and Smart (2004) is to compare the tax
elasticity of ﬁrms which choose not to consolidate their accounts with ﬁrms electing
formula apportionment. One common feature of these papers is that they treat dif-
ferences in proﬁtability between domestic and multinational companies as evidence
for proﬁt shifting. However, this approach can be compromised by the fact that
more productive ﬁrms are more likely to become multinationals. See Maﬃni and
Mokkas (2011) for an empirical analysis of measured proﬁtabilities in domestic and
multinational companies.
A number of recent papers overcomes this problem with international datasets,
which allows them to use the cross-country variation in the tax rates to identify proﬁt
shifting. Huizinga and Laeven (2008) for example use the Amadeus database to ﬁnd
the proﬁt levels of multinational subsidiaries negatively aﬀected by a weighted tax
diﬀerential. Weichenrieder (2009) uses conﬁdential data on German inbound and
1While there is an increasingly large number of international studies on debt shifting, the lit-
erature providing direct evidence for transfer pricing is typically based on conﬁdential US data.
Examples include Swenson (2001) using US Department of Census trade data, Clausing (2003)
using Bureau of Labour Statistics data and Bernard et al. (2006) using the Linked/Longitudinal
Firm Trade Transactions Database.
2For a comprehensive survey of the other strands of empirical proﬁt shifting literature see Dev-
ereux (2007).
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outbound FDI to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect of host country tax rates on after tax prof-
itability. However, due to data restrictions he can not analyse pre-tax proﬁtability.
Finally, Dischinger (2010) is also related to our approach investigating the impact of
tax diﬀerentials between parent and subsidiaries on the pre-tax proﬁtability in the
subsidiary. Scaling proﬁtability by the number of employees he ﬁnds evidence for
proﬁt shifting.
Interestingly, Dischinger (2010) also argues in line with our paper stating '[...]
tax rate eﬀects on pre-tax proﬁts might not be conﬁned solely to proﬁt shifting ac-
tivities, as the incentive to invest in a given country also decreases with the corporate
tax rate' (p. 4). Given the widespread and conclusive empirical evidence that ﬁrms
investment decisions are aﬀected by corporate taxation, we think that it is important
to incorporate the impact of the investment decision into the analysis of proﬁt shift-
ing.3 Therefore the next section introduces a stylized model which allows us to derive
predictions about the impact of tax rates on both pre- and post-tax proﬁtability.
3 Theoretical Background
This section presents a stylized model of a multinational enterprise (MNE) to moti-
vate the subsequent empirical analysis. The algebra and proofs of the equations are
included in the appendix.4
Consider a MNE consisting of two entities 1, 2, which operate in two diﬀerent
countries 1, 2. Without loss of generality we assume that the statutory tax rate in
country 1 is higher than in country 2, i.e. τ1 > τ2. Denote the proﬁt functions of the
two subsidiaries as F1, F2, which are a function of capital K1,K2 respectively and
are assumed to be homogeneous of degree a.5 Further the MNE can transfer a part
of its proﬁts S < F1 from subsidiary 1 to subsidiary 2. However, this proﬁt shifting
activity comes at a cost of:
C =
b
2
(
S
F1
)2
F1 (1)
Although the real costs of proﬁt shifting are not known, we follow the literature
(Hines and Rice (1994), Huizinga and Laeven (2008)) in approximating the proﬁt
shifting cost by a convex function of S so that additional proﬁt shifting becomes more
costly. Further, the costs depend only on F1 for simplicity. An intuitive explanation
for this can be, that the MNE needs to defend the level of proﬁts in particular in
the high tax country. More generally, costs of proﬁt shifting may be resource costs,
such as hiring tax and transfer price experts to allocate eﬃciently accounting proﬁts,
or they can represent costs that the ﬁrm pays only if they are caught by the tax
authorities. A consequence of this functional form is that the bigger the operation
of an MNE in country 1, the cheaper it is to shift a given level of proﬁts between the
3See De Mooij and Ederveen (2008 and 2003) for a comprehensive overview of the empirical
literature.
4The theoretical model in this paper, and the general idea of this paper, builds on Chapter 3
from Mokkas (2009).
5If a function F (K) is homogeneous of degree a, then ∂F (K)
∂K
K = aF (K). In addition, it is
assumed that a < 1, otherwise the model does not have a solution for optimal levels of capital in
the absence of taxation.
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two subsidiaries; and that the higher the level of proﬁts already shifted, the more
costly it is to shift the next unit of proﬁts.
The MNE maximises its overall post-tax proﬁts with respect to the capital stock
K1, K2 and proﬁt shifting S:
max
K1,K2,S
Π = (1− τ1) (F1 − S) + (1− τ2) (F2 + S)− r (K1 +K2)− b
2
S2
F1
(2)
where r is the cost of capital which is determined on the world market and there-
fore equal in both locations. The ﬁrst two terms are the after tax proﬁts made in
each location after proﬁt shifting. The third term represents the opportunity cost
of capital. Finally, the fourth term catches the proﬁt shifting costs. Note that we
assume that the proﬁt shifting costs are not deductible from the tax base of any of
the subsidiaries.6
The ﬁrst order conditions yield:
∂Π
∂K1
!
= 0⇒ F1K = r
1− τ1 + b2
(
S
F1
)2 (3)
∂Π
∂K2
!
= 0⇒ F2K = r
1− τ2 (4)
∂Π
∂S
!
= 0⇒ S = τ1 − τ2
b
F1 (5)
Equation (5) combined with the restriction for an internal solution (S < F1)
dictates that b > τ1 − τ2. Inspection of the ﬁrst order condition for proﬁt shifting
shows that proﬁts are shifted from the high tax country to the low tax country. In
addition, the level of proﬁts shifted is proportional to the true pre-tax proﬁts of
the subsidiary where proﬁts are shifted out of, which is a direct consequence of the
speciﬁc functional form chosen for the costs of proﬁt shifting. With regard to the ﬁrst
order conditions for capital, the marginal product of capital in country 1 is decreasing
in the ratio of proﬁts shifted and increasing in b. Hence, in the speciﬁc model, the
MNE invests more capital in the high tax country relative to the non proﬁt shifting
case, because by shifting proﬁts to a lower tax country the MNE reduces the eﬀective
tax rate faced in the high tax country. In contrast, the ﬁrst order condition for the
low tax country does not include the capital stock, because we assume that proﬁt
shifting costs do not depend on F2.
3.1 Empirical Predictions
Marginal products of capital, FiK , and proﬁt shifting levels, S, usually can not be
observed. Rather, we observe total reported proﬁts, F1−S and F2 +S, and average
proﬁtability, pi1 =
F1−S
K1
and pi2 =
F2+S
K2
. This section describes the relative level of
average proﬁtability of the two subsidiaries and how changes in the tax rates aﬀect
pre- and post-tax proﬁtability.
6This assumption is more plausible if one interprets proﬁt shifting as an illegal activity and the
costs involved the potential ﬁnes if caught. Alternatively the proﬁt shifting costs might simply be
borne by parent companies and are thus not included at the subsidiary level.
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No proﬁt shifting
In order to derive the alternative hypothesis of the absence of proﬁt shifting we
ﬁrst consider the case where proﬁt shifting is not possible (b → ∞, S → 0). This
implies that (3) and (4) simplify to:
F1K =
r
1− τ1 , F2K =
r
1− τ2 (6)
Given that F1, F2 are assumed to be homogenous of degree a then (6) yields:
Average pre-tax proﬁtability: pi1 =
r
a (1− τ1) , pi2 =
r
a (1− τ2)
Average post-tax proﬁtability: (1− τ1)pi1 = r
a
, (1− τ2)pi2 = r
a
(7)
Hence, pre-tax proﬁtability must be higher in the high tax country 1 to to achieve
the equalisation of post-tax proﬁtabilities. To show the eﬀects of a change in the tax
rates on the average proﬁtabilities we partially diﬀerentiate (6) with respect to the
tax rates.
Average pre-tax Proﬁtability Firm 1:
∂pi1
∂τ1
=
r
a (1− τ1)2
,
∂pi1
∂τ2
= 0
Average pre-tax Proﬁtability Firm 2:
∂pi2
∂τ1
= 0,
∂pi2
∂τ2
=
r
a (1− τ2)2
Average post-tax Proﬁtability Firm 1:
∂ [(1− τ1)pi1]
∂τ1
=
∂ [(1− τ1)pi1]
∂τ2
= 0
Average post-tax Proﬁtability Firm 2:
∂ [(1− τ2)pi2]
∂τ1
=
∂ [(1− τ2)pi2]
∂τ2
= 0 (8)
The derivatives in (8) highlight two direct eﬀects of taxes on proﬁtabilities. First
the pre-tax proﬁtabilities react positively to a tax rate change in the own country,
because a higher tax rate reduces the capital stock and therefore increases the prof-
itability. The second direct eﬀect is the direct reduction of the post-tax proﬁtability
due to the higher tax rate. Under the non proﬁt shifting hypothesis, this second eﬀect
exactly compensates for the increased pre-tax proﬁtability to ensure the equalisation
of after tax rate of return. In consequence, the level of average post-tax proﬁtabil-
ity is equalised (see equation 7) across subsidiaries resident in diﬀerent countries no
matter the tax rate. Intuitively, if entrepreneurs eliminate any diﬀerences in post-tax
proﬁtability, pre-tax proﬁtability needs to compensate for the tax disadvantage of a
high tax location.
Proﬁt shifting
Under the alternative hypothesis of proﬁt shifting, we can use the assumption
of homogeneity of degree a to show that the reported average pre-tax proﬁtabilities
are:
pi1 =
1
a
F1K − S
K1
(9)
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pi2 =
1
a
F2K +
S
K2
(10)
While it is not possible to draw any general predictions about the relative level
of reported average pre-tax proﬁtability, it can be shown that pre-tax proﬁtability
will be higher in the low tax country under the following condition
pi2 > pi1 ⇔ τ1 − τ2
2b
+
1
b
(1− τ2)
(
K1
K2
+ 1
)
> 1 (11)
Inequality (11) is a function of the relative capital stock K1K2 , the tax rates and
proﬁt shifting cost parameter b. And, if proﬁt shifting is not too costly (b −→
(τ1 − τ2)),7 then reported pre-tax proﬁtability will be higher in the low tax country.
With regard to average reported post-tax proﬁtability it is straightforward to
show that8:
(1− τ2)pi2 > (1− τ1)pi1 (12)
Therefore, if multinationals engage in proﬁt shifting, subsidiaries in low tax coun-
tries should report higher average post-tax proﬁtability than subsidiaries resident in
countries with higher tax rates.
Eﬀects on proﬁtabilities in subsidiary 1
To illustrate the eﬀects of a tax rate change on the average pre-tax proﬁtability of
subsidiary 1 we diﬀerentiate (9) with respect to the two tax rates. Some rearranging
yields
∂pi1
∂τ1
=
2r
[
2b (b− 1− τ1 + 2τ2) + (τ1 − τ2)2
]
a
[
2b (1− τ1) + (τ1 − τ2)2
]2 (13)
∂pi1
∂τ2
=
2r
[
2b (1− τ2)− (τ1 − τ2)2
]
a
[
2b (1− τ1) + (τ1 − τ2)2
]2 (14)
Unfortunately, one cannot make unambiguous predictions about the sign of (13).
This is due to the fact, that additionally to the direct eﬀect of increased proﬁtabil-
ity due to the reduction in the capital invested in this subsidiary, there are now two
counteracting eﬀects. First, the capital reduction is mitigated by the fact that higher
proﬁts in subsidiary 1 are not fully subject to the higher tax rate and additionally
the cost of proﬁt shifting will be cheaper the higher the level of proﬁt. Therefore
the level of capital invested in subsidiary 1 will be higher under the proﬁt shifting
hypothesis, compared to the case without proﬁt shifting. More directly, an increase
of the tax rate in country 1 will induce more proﬁt shifting and thereby reduces the
proﬁtability in subsidiary 1. The smaller the cost parameter of proﬁt shifting, b, the
7Equation (5) combined with the restriction for an internal solution (S < F1) dictates that
b > τ1 − τ2.
8See appendix for all proofs.
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stronger the latter eﬀect. Hence, if proﬁt shifting is not too costly, i.e. b→ (τ1− τ2),
(13) will be unambiguously negative.
The increase of the tax rate in the low tax country has more clear cut eﬀects.
First, the incentive to shift proﬁts out of the high tax country decreases. In addi-
tion, the reduction in the proﬁt shifting capability increases the eﬀective tax rate of
the subsidiary in location 1 and thus, reduces the capital size. Both of these eﬀects
increase pre-tax proﬁtability, which is evident in equation (14). Taking into account
that b > τ1 − τ2 and (1− τ2) > (τ1 − τ2), it is immediate that the numerator, and
therefore the whole term, is positive.
The eﬀects of the tax changes on the average reported after-tax proﬁtability, are
similar, as it can be shown that:
∂ [(1− τ1)pi1]
∂τ1
= −
2r
[
2b (1− τ1) (1− τ2)− (1− τ2 − b) (τ1 − τ2)2
]
a
[
2b (1− τ1) + (τ1 − τ2)2
]2 (15)
∂ [(1− τ1)pi1]
∂τ2
=
2r (1− τ1)
[
2b (1− τ2)− (τ1 − τ2)2
]
a
[
2b (1− τ1) + (τ1 − τ2)2
]2 (16)
In addition to the above described eﬀects there is the direct negative eﬀect of the
tax rate change on the after tax proﬁtability. Therefore, given that b > τ1− τ2, (15)
is unambiguously negative. Hence, an increase in the tax rate of country 1 decreases
average reported post-tax proﬁtability of subsidiary 1.
The eﬀect of a tax change in the low tax country on the post-tax proﬁtability in
country 1 is in line with the eﬀect on the pre-tax proﬁt. In fact, the derivative in
(16) is just scaled down by the factor (1− τ1) and therefore unambiguously positive
like (14). This is due to the fact the increased proﬁt shifting incentives apply to
the pre-tax proﬁts in subsidiary 1. Consequently they are equally applicable to the
post tax proﬁts, only reduced because of the higher tax rate in country 1. Thus, the
average reported after-tax proﬁtability of subsidiary 1 is positively aﬀected by an
increase in the tax rate of country 2.
Eﬀects on proﬁtability in subsidiary 2
The proﬁtability of the subsidiary in country 2 depends on the capital stock
there, the proﬁts shifted into the country and consequently also on the capital stock
in country 1 which determines the cost of proﬁt shifting. Hence, in order to make
progress with respect to the comparative statics of the reported proﬁtability of sub-
sidiary 2 one needs to to solve for the capital in both countries K1,K2 and substitute
into (10). We assume proﬁt functions are of the functional form Fi = AiK
a
i , where
Ai is the total factor productivity of the subsidiary.
9 Diﬀerentiation of (10) with
9Using (3), (4) and (5) one can solve for the relative capital stock
K1
K2
=
(
A1
A2
)1/1−a [1− τ1 + (τ1−τ2)22b
1− τ2
]1/1−a
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respect to τ1 then yields:
∂pi2
∂τ1
=
r
ab (1− τ2)
1
1−a
(
A1
A2
) 1
1−a
[
1− τ1 + (τ1 − τ2)
2
2b
] a
1−a
[
1 +
a (τ1 − τ2)
1− a
2(τ1 − τ2 − b)
2b(1− τ1) + (τ1 − τ2)2
]
(17)
The most intuitive eﬀect of a tax rate change in country 1 on the proﬁtability in
subsidiary 2 is via proﬁt shifting. A higher tax rate in the high tax country ceteris
paribus leads to more proﬁt shifted to the subsidiary in the low tax country and
therefore increases proﬁtability there. However, at the same time the increased tax
in country 1 will reduce the capital stock invested and therefore decreases the total
amount of proﬁt and consequently the proﬁt which will be shifted to the low tax
subsidiary. The latter eﬀect will be mitigated because the costs of proﬁt depend on
the proﬁts made in subsidiary 1 which will increase the capital stock relative to the
no proﬁt shifting case. The overall eﬀect of a tax rate in country 1 on the pre-tax
proﬁtability of subsidiary 2 will be positive if proﬁt shifting is not very expensive, as
can be seen in equations (17), which will be unambiguously positive if b −→ (τ1 − τ2).
Given that the unambiguous sign for the eﬀect of a tax rate change for pre-tax
proﬁtability, the eﬀect of a tax rate change in country 1 on the post-tax proﬁtability
in country 2 will be equally unambiguously positive. This is evident from (18) which
is identical to (17) but scaled down with (1− τ2).
∂ [(1− τ2)pi2]
∂τ1
=
r
ab (1− τ2)
a
1−a
(
A1
A2
) 1
1−a
[
1− τ1 + (τ1 − τ2)
2
2b
] a
1−a
[
1 +
a (τ1 − τ2)
1− a
2(τ1 − τ2 − b)
2b(1− τ1) + (τ1 − τ2)2
]
(18)
The eﬀect of a tax rate change in country 2 on the pre-tax proﬁtability of sub-
sidiary 2 is ambiguous. On the one hand there is the direct positive eﬀect via the
reduced capital, while at the same time reduced proﬁt shifting lower proﬁtability in
the subsidiary. The latter eﬀect will be reinforced because of less capital invested in
country 1 because, the eﬀective tax burden increases. A diﬀerent explanation for the
same eﬀect is that the incentive to lower costs for proﬁt shifting is reduced. Con-
sequently the eﬀect of a tax rate change in country 2 will directly increase pre-tax
proﬁtability in subsidiary 2 which is captured in the ﬁrst term in (19) and indirectly
reduce proﬁtability which is captured in the second term.
∂pi2
∂τ2
=
r
a(1− τ2)2 −
r
ab(1− τ2)
(
A1
A2
) 1
1−a
[
1− τ1 + (τ1−τ2)
2
2b
1− τ2
] a
1−a
[
1 +
1
1− a
(
2a(τ1 − τ2)2
2b(1− τ1) + (τ1 − τ2)2 −
τ1 − τ2
1− τ2
)]
(19)
In contrast, the ambiguity disappears in the eﬀect of a tax rate change in country
two on the reported post-tax proﬁtability of subsidiary 2. This is due to the fact that
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the reduction in capital and the resulting increase in pre-tax proﬁtability exactly
compensates for the higher tax burden. This eﬀect is the one described in non proﬁt
shifting case above. Hence we are left with the eﬀects an increase in τ2 has on proﬁt
shifting. There is the direct eﬀect of reduced proﬁt shifting, because of the smaller
tax diﬀerential and the indirect eﬀect of less capital in subsidiary 1. Both reduce
the level of proﬁts in subsidiary 2. At the same time, because of the reduced capital
in subsidiary 2, the denominator also decreases which could increase the overall
proﬁtability. However, equation (20) shows that the negative eﬀect of the reduced
proﬁt shifting dominates, since the last term in the brackets can be never larger than
-1 for τ1 < 1.
∂ [(1− τ2)pi2]
∂τ2
= − r
ab
(
A1
A2
)1/1−a [1− τ1 + (τ1−τ2)22b
1− τ2
] a
1−a
[
1 +
a
1− a
(
2 (b− τ1 + τ2) (τ1 − τ2)
2b (1− τ1) + (τ1 − τ2)2
− τ1 − τ2
1− τ2
)]
(20)
To sum up, if proﬁt shifting is possible, then a reduction in the host country
tax rate will bring an ambiguous change to average reported pre-tax proﬁtability,
although the model suggests that if proﬁt shifting is not very costly it will reduce
pre-tax proﬁtability. On the other hand, a reduction in the host country tax rate
will unambiguously increase average reported post-tax proﬁtability.
The predictions of the model are summarized in Table 1. In the empirical analysis,
we will be focusing on the eﬀects of the tax rate on reported pre- and post-tax
proﬁtability, which are the shaded areas in the Table 1. We restrict our analysis
on these direct eﬀects of tax rates on proﬁtabilities of subsidiaries located there,
because the data does not necessarily cover all subsidiaries of multinational groups.
In consequence we do not have reliable information on the distribution of the tax
rates in other countries where the group has aﬃliates.
Table 1: Comparative Statics of Average Proﬁtabilities
No Proﬁt Shifting Proﬁt Shifting
Tax Rate τ1 Tax Rate τ2 Tax Rate τ1 Tax Rate τ2
Pre-tax average
proﬁtability of positive independent ambiguous (-) positive
Subsidiary 1
Pre-tax average
proﬁtability of independent positive ambiguous (+) ambiguous
Subsidiary 2
Post-tax average
proﬁtability of independent independent negative positive
Subsidiary 1
Post-tax average
proﬁtability of independent independent ambiguous (+) negative
Subsidiary 2
Signs in parentheses hold if proﬁt shifting is not a costly option for multinationals.
The stylized model presented in this section highlights that, if one is to test
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empirically the eﬀect of the tax rate on average proﬁtability, then both the numerator
(proﬁts) and the denominator (assets) should be taken into account. If the tax rate
increases then proﬁts decrease due to proﬁt shifting and because less capital is located
there. However, because capital decreases, due to the marginal conditions, pre-tax
proﬁtability may increase or decrease. The predictions for post-tax proﬁtability are
unambiguous, hence a negative coeﬃcient can be interpreted as evidence for proﬁt
shifting. If in addition, pre-tax proﬁtability is negatively aﬀected by the tax rate,
then this is a signal of proﬁt shifting being relatively cheap, and strictly inconsistent
with the alternative predictions of this model in the absence of proﬁt shifting.
4 Data Description
The data on subsidiaries of multinational companies are taken from the Amadeus
database provided by Bureau van Dijk (BvD). Since Bureau van Dijk database has
been used extensively in this strand of research, for example in Huizinga and Laeven
(2008) and Dischinger (2010) we do not present the data in detail, but rather high-
light where we use the data diﬀerently.10
We start with a download of the large and very large companies from the online
version of Amadeus dataset. The use of the online version allows us to use more
recent data, with ownership information updated up to February 2011 and full data
coverage up to the end of 2009. At the time of the download the Amadeus sample of
large and very large companies included 540,832 companies in 44 European countries.
We then identify the group structures using information about immediate shareholder
with more than 50 percent ownership and the reported global ultimate shareholders.
Table 2 splits the downloaded sample into diﬀerent categories according to the group
structure. The ﬁrst column lists the total number of ﬁrms in each country of our ﬁnal
sample and sums the number of ﬁrms in other European countries.11 The next three
columns show the number of ﬁrms we exclude for the purpose of this study. First
there are standalone companies, i.e. ﬁrms which report neither a corporate subsidiary
nor a majority corporate shareholder. Further we exclude parent companies, because
for most of them we only have the consolidated accounts. Further even if we have
the unconsolidated accounts parent companies very often perform mostly holding
activities, which might imply very diﬀerent proﬁt shifting possibilities. We also
exclude subsidiaries in domestic groups because they do not have the proﬁt shifting
opportunities we want to investigate in this empirical analysis.
10A detailled description of the construction of the sample is available from the authors upon
request.
11For some important countries, e.g. Switzerland, Norway or Ireland, we end up with insuﬃcient
ﬁrms to include them in our regressions. This is due to missing information in key variables like
tax payments and/or proﬁts.
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Column ﬁve reports the number of subsidiaries in MNE groups. This includes all
companies which report a corporate owner, which owns more than 50 percent. Fur-
ther the corporate group must have subsidiaries in at least two diﬀerent countries,
in order to allocate the subsidiary to this category. Note, that this also includes
subsidiaries in the same country as the headquarter. Finally, the last two columns
compare the number of ﬁrms and the corresponding number of observations, which
remain in our ﬁnal sample.12 At the ﬁrst glance the drop to 39,460 ﬁrms appears
dramatic. However, to the best of our knowledge, this is one of the largest samples
- both in terms of ﬁrms and countries - used for an empirical study of this type.
This study investigates the eﬀects of host country corporate tax rates on pre-
and post-tax proﬁtability. The model outlined in section 3 predicts that under the
hypothesis of proﬁt shifting post-tax proﬁtability should be unambiguously nega-
tively aﬀected by a tax rate increase in the subsidiary country. We use two measures
of post-tax proﬁtability. The ﬁrst measure of post-tax proﬁtability is the ratio of
earnings before interest and after taxes over total assets (EBI/TA). For robust-
ness, we use proﬁts and losses after taxes over total assets (PLAT/TA) as a second
measure of post-tax proﬁtability, which is a measure of net-of-tax return on assets.
The numerator of the latter measure is equal to the the earnings before interest
and taxation (EBIT ) plus the net ﬁnancial proﬁts and losses minus taxation. The
net ﬁnancial proﬁts include interest payments and receipts, thus PLAT/TA, unlike
EBI/TA, subtracts interest payments from the measure of the proﬁts. Since this is
the proﬁt attributable to shareholders, one may argue that the denominator of the
latter measure of post-tax proﬁtability should have been equity capital, which would
make the ratio a measure of after-tax return on equity. We do not do this here in
order for the results to be comparable with other studies (e.g. Weichenrieder (2009)).
Regarding pre-tax proﬁtability, we use the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes
over total assets (EBIT/TA). Alternatively we also use the reported proﬁt before
taxation over total assets (PLBT/TA), which includes ﬁnancial proﬁts and losses
and therefore corresponds to the PLAT/TA measure.
In the descriptive statistics in Table 3 one can see that both measures of pre-tax
proﬁtability are on average close to 0.09 and range from -0.55 to 0.71. This indi-
cates that we include negative proﬁtabilities in our analysis.13 It is not a priori clear
whether proﬁt shifting remains an issue if a subsidiary is in a loss making position,
but we prefer to initially include loss making subsidiaries to restrict the censoring
of the data. We will return to the issue of loss making companies in the robustness
checks. After tax proﬁtabilities are above 0.06 on average and range from -0.51 to
0.61. This lower average and the reduced variation primarily on the positive side
appears plausible because the part of proﬁts which is taxed away is larger for proﬁt
making ﬁrms.
The primary regressor we are interested in is the host country tax rate. This
includes the top corporate tax rate plus local proﬁt taxes. For the local taxes we
12The detailled description of the data cleaning criteria are available from the authors upon
request.
13We treat observations which deviate more than one half of the standard deviation from the
mean as outliers. Admittedly, this criteria is rather arbitrary, but the results do not change much
with alternative cut oﬀ points.
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use the unweighted average of the local proﬁt tax rates.14 Over the sample period
from 2002 to 2009 corporate tax rates were signiﬁcantly reduced. The extent of tax
rate reductions varies from minor reductions in France due to the abolition of the
tax professionelle to signiﬁcant drops from 23.5% to 10% in Bulgaria or from 31% to
20% in the Czech Republic.
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Observations Mean St. Dev Min Max
EBI/TA 265,717 0.063 0.105 -0.512 0.617
PLAT/TA 265,717 0.062 0.109 -0.517 0.619
EBIT/TA 265,717 0.089 0.132 -0.554 0.713
PLBT/TA 265,717 0.088 0.137 -0.559 0.716
log(TA) 265,717 9.668 1.666 0.000 22.147
log(EMP ) 253,704 4.494 1.539 0.000 12.471
Leverage 265,717 0.627 0.241 0.000 1.000
Growth rate 265,717 1.246 3.524 -17.616 12.954
Interest rate 265,717 4.065 3.064 0.398 27.310
Inﬂation 265,717 102.987 10.004 70.417 178.605
Notes: Leverage is deﬁned as the current plus non-current liabilities over total
assets. Growth rate is the annual growth rate of GDP per capita. Interest rate
denotes the 3-month money market rate. Inﬂation is the consumer price index.
Apart from the host country tax rate we will use several control variables to cap-
ture the eﬀects of observed factors that might be related to proﬁtability. The control
variables are the logarithm of total assets (log(TA)) and several country variables.
The logarithm of total assets may reﬂect that larger companies are more mature and
less risky and hence, have lower proﬁtability. On the other hand, it may capture
that larger companies have superior technology and market power and thus, higher
proﬁtability. We also include the logarithm of the number of employees (log(EMP ))
as an alternative measure of ﬁrm size. The country control variables include GDP
per capita growth, which is expected to be positively related to proﬁtability. In
addition, the inﬂation rate as measured by the consumer price index is included
to control for the impact of general price inﬂation on measured proﬁts and assets.
Financial statements are prepared on the historical basis accounting. This method
does not take into account the level of prices when valuing assets. Ignoring changes
in the general price level may understate the economic value of assets to a ﬁrm as
well as overstate ﬁrms' proﬁts. Thus, inﬂation is expected to be positively related
to ﬁrm proﬁtability (cf. Feldstein and Summers (1979)). Finally, the money market
interest rate is included, which may capture the eﬀects of credit conditions in a coun-
try. This is the annual average of the 3-month interest rate for the domestic money
market. A higher interest rate means that ﬁrms will only undertake projects with
higher returns and thus the money market interest rate is expected to be positively
related to proﬁtability. Data on GDP per capital growth and inﬂation is provided by
the World Bank, and the money market interest rate by Eurostat and the national
banks of the countries in question.
14The information on the tax rates is an extension of the data used in Loretz (2008). Addi-
tional information stems mostly from the Global Tax Surveys of the International Bureau of Fiscal
Documentation (IBFD), and the KPMG corporate tax rates surveys.
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5 Results
This section presents the econometric results. First, we present our baseline re-
gression of the four proﬁtability measures on corporate tax rates and several control
variables in detail. We will use a panel ﬁxed eﬀect approach as our workhorse model.
We then run several robustness checks to account for the potential impact of debt,
loss making companies or diﬀerent circumstances in transition countries.
Before starting the presentation and the discussion of the results, we illustrate
the relationship between the tax rate and each of the proﬁtability measures, using
average values of the ﬁrm-level measures in each host country averaged over all eight
years. Figure 5 is the scatter plot of each country's average pre-tax proﬁtability
(EBIT/TA) and post-tax proﬁtability (EBI/TA) versus the average tax rate over
the period of 2002-2009.
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The black circles displaying pre-tax proﬁtability and the gray diamonds repre-
senting post-tax proﬁtability show considerable variation across countries. Apart
from the outlier Serbia (including Montenegro before 2008) Figure 5 indicates that
subsidiaries in high tax countries tend to be less proﬁtable than those in low tax coun-
tries. In addition, the slope of the relationship in the post-tax proﬁtability graph is
slightly steeper than that of the pre-tax proﬁtability. Although the graphs do not
control for characteristics of aﬃliates or country characteristics that are unrelated
to tax rates, there is indicative evidence that favours the proﬁt shifting hypothesis.
5.1 Baseline Results
The benchmark for our empirical study are the ﬁxed eﬀects regressions for all coun-
tries. The dependent variables presented are EBIT/TA and PLBT/TA as measures
for pre-tax proﬁtability and EBI/TA, and PLAT/TA for post-tax proﬁtability. In
addition to the host country tax rate, which is our regressor of primary interest we
include several control variables. The logarithm of total assets and the logarithm
of the number of employees are intended to capture the impact of the size of the
ﬁrm. GDP per capita growth, the inﬂation rate, and the money market interest rate
14
further control for the investment opportunities in the host countries. Given some
of our control variables vary only at a higher level, all the standard errors correct
for clustering of errors across country/industry cells. Table 4 reports the results for
four baseline regressions.
Table 4: Baseline Results
pre-tax proﬁtability post-tax proﬁtability
Dependent variable EBIT/TA PLBT/TA EBI/TA PLAT/TA
Host Tax 0.020 -0.036 -0.056*** -0.108***
(0.027) (0.032) (0.021) (0.026)
Log Total Assets -0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.002*
(0.001) (0.002) 0.001 (0.001)
Log Number of Employees 0.006*** 0.003** 0.003*** 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
GDP Growth 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001***
(0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000
Log Inﬂation 0.025** 0.022 0.028*** 0.012
(0.013) (0.014) (0.010) (0.012)
Money Rate 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Time Dummies Y Y Y Y
Firm Fixed eﬀects Y Y Y Y
Firms 39,110 39,110 39,110 39,110
Observations 253,106 253,106 253,106 253,106
R2 0.015 0.016 0.011 0.014
Notes: All regressions are estimated by panel data within groups estimators and includeyear dummies.
Host Tax is the country's statutory tax rate including local taxes. GDP Growth is the GDP per capita
growth rate provided by the World Bank. Inﬂation is the logarithm of the consumer price index
provided by the World Bank. Money Rate is the annual average of the 3 month interest rate for the
domestic money market provided by Eurostat. Robust standard errors that correct for clustering of
errors within country/industry cells are presented in the parentheses. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant
at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
Starting with pre-tax proﬁtability, Table 4 shows that the coeﬃcient on the tax
rate is ambiguous and insigniﬁcant for both measures of proﬁtability. This is in
stark contrast to the regressions on post-tax proﬁtability where the coeﬃcient for
the host country tax rate has a signiﬁcant negative sign. Further the coeﬃcient al-
most doubles in size from -0.056 for EBI/TA to -0.108 for PLAT/TA, which hints
at a special role for ﬁnancial proﬁts and losses. We will return to the role of debt
instruments for proﬁt shifting in the robustness checks below. Overall, the eﬀect of a
change in the tax rate on reported proﬁtability is negative for after-tax proﬁtability
and ambiguous for pre-tax proﬁtability. This is consistent with the proﬁt shifting
hypothesis, under which the reported post- and possibly pre-tax proﬁtability of sub-
sidiaries in high tax countries should be lower than that of subsidiaries in low tax
countries. Furthermore, it is certainly inconsistent with the alternative theory of no
proﬁt shifting under which the tax rate should have a positive impact on pre-tax
proﬁtability and no impact on post-tax proﬁtability.
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The size of the company measured by the number of employees is found to have
a signiﬁcant positive impact for most pre- and post-tax proﬁtability measures, while
the log of total assets is only signiﬁcant for PLAT/TA. The fact that at most one of
the size measures turns out to be signiﬁcant is mostly due to the positive correlation
between the two variables. Further the division bias (Borjas (1980)) potentially
contributes to the employees being signiﬁcant rather than the total assets.15 Out
of the coeﬃcients on the country controls the GDP growth rate has the expected
positive sign in all regressions. Further the inﬂation turns out to be signiﬁcant in
both regressions using proﬁtability measures excluding the ﬁnancial proﬁts.
5.2 The role of debt
The fact that the tax eﬀect on reported post-tax proﬁtability is twice as large for
the measure of proﬁtability including ﬁnancial proﬁts and losses indicates that the
use of debt as a mean of proﬁt shifting is potentially very important. To control
for the use of debt as a mean of proﬁt shifting we include the ﬁrm leverage as an
additional control variable. First, there is the non-tax related impact of proﬁtabil-
ity on the ﬁnancing decision of the ﬁrm. According to the pecking order theory
(cf. Myers and Majluf (1984)), companies will ﬁnance investment projects ﬁrst with
retained earnings and then with debt. Thus, one expects less proﬁtable ﬁrms to
ﬁnance investment using debt and thus the leverage ratio and proﬁtability should be
negatively associated. However, there may be a limit to the above channel. There
is now a growing literature on the use of debt to shift proﬁts, which indicates that
ﬁrms with high pre-tax proﬁtabilities may strategically use debt in order to bene-
ﬁt from the deduction of interest for tax purposes.16 Both arguments imply that
causality runs from proﬁtability to leverage.17 Before discussing the results, we want
the reader to be aware that there may be a degree of simultaneity in one of our
regressions. Speciﬁcally, the level of leverage may aﬀect the concurrent measure of
post-tax proﬁtability, PLBT/TA, through interest deductions, i.e. causality may
also run from leverage to proﬁtability. However, we believe that the level of leverage
drives primarily the level of future interest deductions and thus simultaneity should
be weak.
15For example, if the value of total assets is over-estimated in the reported accounts, this would
tend to reduce each of the proﬁtability measures.
16Early empirical studies based on Canadian data (Jog and Tang (2001)) or US data (Desai et al.
(2004)) indicate that debt plays an important role in proﬁt shifting. Using an international dataset
Huizinga et al (2008) provide further evidence for debt reacting to tax diﬀerentials. For more recent
evidence on the role of internal debt in proﬁt shifting and a review of the literature see Buettner
and Wamser (2009).
17This assumption is supported by recent evidence for a one-way Granger causality from prof-
itability to leverage by Bartoloni (2011).
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Table 5: The role of debt
pre-tax proﬁtability post-tax proﬁtability
Dependent variable EBIT/TA PLBT/TA EBI/TA PLAT/TA
Host Tax 0.070** 0.026 -0.017 -0.056**
(0.029) (0.032) (0.023) (0.026)
Debt ratio -0.160*** -0.200*** -0.126*** -0.166***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Log Total Assets 0.004*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.009***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Log Number of Employees 0.007*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
GDP Growth 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log Inﬂation 0.032** 0.030** 0.033*** 0.019
(0.013) (0.014) (0.011) (0.012)
Money Rate 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Time Dummies Y Y Y Y
Firm Fixed eﬀects Y Y Y Y
Firms 39,110 39,110 39,110 39,110
Observations 253,106 253,106 253,106 253,106
R2 0.059 0.080 0.051 0.014
Notes: All regressions are estimated by panel data within groups estimators and include year dummies.
Host Tax is the country's statutory tax rate including local taxes. GDP Growth is the GDP per capita
growth rate provided by theWorld Bank. Inﬂation is the logarithm of the consumer price index provided
by the World Bank. Money Rate is the annual average of the 3 month interest rate for the domestic
money market provided by the Eurostat. Debt ratio is the sum of current and non-current liabilities
over total assets. Robust standard errors that correct for clustering of errors within country/industry
cells are presented in the parentheses. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
The results in Table 5 are rather strong. The newly included debt variable is
highly signiﬁcant in all speciﬁcations. Additionally, accounting for the strong nega-
tive eﬀect of the debt level on proﬁtability the signs of the tax rate in the regressions
with the EBIT proﬁtability measures change. Controlling for the level of debt the
tax rate now has a positive eﬀect on EBIT/TA and no eﬀect on EBI/TA. These
signs are in line with the prediction of the no proﬁt shifting case in our stylized
model. Put diﬀerently, this would indicate that debt shifting is the primary form
of proﬁt shifting. However, the results for the regressions which use proﬁtability
measures after ﬁnancial proﬁts and losses remain unaﬀected by the inclusion of the
debt level as an additional control. The host country tax rate still has a signiﬁcant
negative sign for post-tax proﬁtability and no eﬀect on pre-tax proﬁtability. This
is in line with our predictions for the presence of proﬁt shifting. Hence, the inclu-
sion of the debt level indicates that while proﬁt shifting may to a large extent be
organized through debt shifting, there are other potential ways to reallocate proﬁts
via ﬁnancial transactions. One of the potential channels, which has recently gained
some considerable attention is the use of royalty payments.18
18See for example Dischinger and Riedel (2011) and Karkinsky and Riedel (2009).
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5.3 Robustness checks
One immediate concern which may arise is the role of loss making subsidiaries. Ar-
guably ﬁrms have little incentive to shift proﬁts out of a country if they are already in
a loss making position there. Furthermore, if the subsidiary has been in a signiﬁcant
loss position it may also have the possibility to reduce its tax burden by means of loss
carry forward. Therefore we might also expect ﬁrms which were in a loss position
in previous years to be less inclined to use proﬁt shifting. The ﬁrst two robustness
checks in Table 6 address this issue. The top block excludes the observations, which
have a loss in the current year. This reduces the sample size by roughly 50,000 ob-
servations, but aﬀects the number of ﬁrms much less with a reduction of only about
2,000 ﬁrms. In contrast the second block in Table 6 excludes all ﬁrms which have
a loss in any of the periods we observe. This reduces the number of ﬁrms rather
dramatically to only 15,617. This reﬂects that a very large number of companies
reported losses in the recent economic crises.
Table 6: Robustness checks
pre-tax proﬁtability post-tax proﬁtability
Dependent variable EBIT/TA PLBT/TA EBI/TA PLAT/TA
Excluding observations with a loss in this period
Host Tax 0.034 0.002 -0.057*** -0.098***
(0.026) (0.028) (0.019) (0.021)
Firms 37,819 37,811 37,753 37,726
Observations 209,647 207,634 205,286 203,117
Excluding ﬁrms with a loss in any period
Host Tax 0.013 -0.029 -0.103*** -0.145***
(0.032) (0.033) (0.023) (0.025)
Firms 15,617 15,617 15,617 15,617
Observations 99,119 99,119 99,119 99,119
Excluding ﬁrms in transitions countries
Host Tax -0.000 0.006 -0.065*** -0.059***
(0.029) (0.030) (0.022) (0.023)
Firms 31,385 31,385 31,385 31,385
Observations 204,917 204,917 204,917 204,917
Only ﬁrms in transitions countries
Host Tax 0.038 -0.070 -0.114*** -0.212***
(0.041) (0.048) (0.036) (0.045)
Firms 7,725 7,725 7,725 7,725
Observations 48,189 48,189 48,189 48,189
Notes: All regressions are estimated by panel data within groups estimators and include the same con-
trol variables (including the debt ratio) as the previous regressions. Robust standard errors that correct
for clustering of errors within country/industry cells are presented in the parentheses. * signiﬁcant at
10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
The results for the subsamples without loss making observations or loss making
ﬁrms conﬁrm the ﬁnding of the baseline results. When excluding only the observa-
tions with losses the results closely resemble our benchmark results, both in terms of
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sign and magnitude of the tax eﬀects. This is a striking result since these robustness
checks also include the debt level as an additional control. The previous result of
no proﬁt shifting once the debt level is controlled for disappears, if we exclude the
observations with negative proﬁts. Further, when excluding all the ﬁrms with a loss
arising in any period the magnitude of the coeﬃcient for tax rate increases substan-
tially. Excluding all the companies which have losses at some point during 2002 and
2009 implies using only the most proﬁtable companies. It certainly appears consis-
tent with the general concept of proﬁt shifting that these companies react stronger
to tax rate changes.
The second concern we are addressing in the robustness checks is the fact that
the transition countries made the most aggressive tax cuts. At the same time the
transition process could have been an important factor leading to higher proﬁtabil-
ity. While the inclusion of country ﬁxed eﬀects accounts for the country speciﬁc
characteristics, it could still be the case that the negative sign for the host country
tax rate is primarily driven by a few subsidiaries in the transition economies. To
overcome these concerns we split the sample into the transition economies and the
developed economies.19 The results in the third block of Table 6 show the eﬀects for
the subsidiaries in the developed economies and the fourth block for the subsidiaries
in the transition. The results conﬁrm the suspicion that the tax eﬀect is larger in
the transition countries. However, the results are still line with the predictions for
the proﬁt shifting hypothesis, even after excluding the transition economies from the
sample. One interesting feature of this ﬁnal robustness check is that the tax eﬀect
on the EBI/TA proﬁt measure is roughly in line with the coeﬃcient for tax in the
PLAT/TA regression once we only use the developed economies. In contrast using
only the transition countries we can see a stronger eﬀect of a tax rate change on
the PLAT/TA measure. A tentative conclusion can be that the use of ﬁnancial
instruments plays a more important role in the transition countries.
6 Conclusion
This paper investigates the extent to which subsidiaries of multinational ﬁrms in 25
countries engage in proﬁt shifting. In contrast to the preceding theoretical literature,
which has modelled the eﬀects of taxes on the level of reported proﬁts, we model
the eﬀects of corporate taxes on proﬁtability measured as the ratio of proﬁts to total
assets. It becomes apparent that theoretical predictions in the case of proﬁt shifting
are not clear cut with regard to pre-tax proﬁtability. If a country increases its tax
rate, then the aﬃliate will decrease its capital stock to satisfy the marginal condi-
tion, which will tend to raise pre-tax proﬁtability. In addition, it will transfer proﬁts
to lower-taxed aﬃliates. Hence, pre-tax proﬁtability, which is the ratio of reported
pre-tax proﬁts over total assets, may not decrease if proﬁt shifting is a suﬃciently
costly activity and the former eﬀect dominates. On the other hand, if there is proﬁt
shifting, then reported post-tax proﬁtability should deﬁnitely be reduced in reaction
to an increase in the tax rate.
The empirical work extends the existing literature by looking at both pre- and
19For the purpose of this paper we deﬁne the following countries as transition countries: Bulgaria,
Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovak
Republic and the Ukraine.
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post-tax proﬁtability of the same sample of multinational subsidiaries, as opposed
to the papers which look at either pre- or post-tax proﬁtability but not in conjunc-
tion. The primary results come from a sample on 39,110 ﬁrms over the period of
2002-2009 inclusive. Results are consistent with the hypothesis that multinationals
transfer proﬁts between their foreign subsidiaries for tax reasons. Our results suggest
that a 10 percentage point increase in the host country corporate tax rate decreases
post-tax proﬁtability excluding ﬁnancial proﬁts by 0.6 percentage points. For proﬁts
measures including ﬁnancial proﬁts the tax elasticity is even higher with a 1.1 per-
centage point increase. Extensive robustness checks show that proﬁtable ﬁrms tend
to shift more proﬁts and that debt shifting appears to be a key channel for proﬁt
shifting. The latter is especially true with respect to the transition countries where
the tax diﬀerential is larger.
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Appendix
A.1 Theoretical Model
In this section we present a stylized model of a multinational enterprise (MNE). The
MNE consists of two entities 1, 2, which operate in two diﬀerent countries 1, 2 with
statutory tax rates τ1 > τ2. The proﬁt functions of the two subsidiaries are given
by F1, F2, which are a function of capital K1,K2 respectively and are assumed to
be homogeneous of degree a < 1.1 In addition, we assume that the MNE transfers
proﬁts S < F1 from subsidiary 1 to subsidiary 2. We assume that the proﬁt shifting
activity comes at a cost of:
C =
b
2
(
S
F1
)2
F1 (A.1)
The MNE is maximising its overall post-tax proﬁts with respect to the capital
stock K1, K2 and proﬁt shifting S:
max
K1,K2,S
Π = (1− τ1) (F1 − S) + (1− τ2) (F2 + S)− r (K1 +K2)− b
2
S2
F1
(A.2)
where r is the cost of capital which is assumed to be equal in both locations.
The ﬁrst order conditions yield:
∂F1
∂K1
= F1K =
r
1− τ1 + b2
(
S
F1
)2 (A.3)
∂F2
∂K2
= F2K =
r
1− τ2 (A.4)
S =
τ1 − τ2
b
F1 (A.5)
Equation (A.5) combined with the restriction for an internal solution (S < F1)
dictates that b > τ1 − τ2.
In the case of no proﬁt shifting (b→∞, S → 0), from (A.3) and (A.4):
F1K =
r
1− τ1 , F2K =
r
1− τ2 (A.6)
Given that F1, F2 are assumed homogeneous of degree a then (A.6) yields:
Average pre-tax Proﬁtability:
F1
K1
=
r
a (1− τ1) ,
F2
K2
=
r
a (1− τ2) (A.7)
Average post-tax Proﬁtability:
F1
K1
(1− τ1) = r
a
,
F2
K2
(1− τ2) = r
a
1If a function F (K) is homogeneous of degree a, then ∂F (K)
∂K
K = aF (K). In addition, it is
assumed that a < 1, otherwise the model cannot have a solution for the optimal capital level of
capital in the absence of taxation.
A.1
Hence, pre-tax proﬁtabilities must vary with the local tax rate to achieve the
equalisation of post-tax proﬁtability. Partial diﬀerentiation of (A.7) with respect to
the tax rates yields:
Average pre-tax Proﬁtability Firm 1:
∂ F1K1
∂τ1
=
r
a (1− τ1)2
,
∂ F1K1
∂τ2
= 0 (A.8)
Average pre-tax Proﬁtability Firm 2:
∂ F2K2
∂τ2
=
r
a (1− τ2)2
,
∂ F2K2
∂τ1
= 0
Average post-tax Proﬁtability Firm 1:
∂
[
F1
K1
(1− τ1)
]
∂τ1
=
∂
[
F1
K1
(1− τ1)
]
∂τ2
= 0
Average post-tax Proﬁtability Firm 2:
∂
[
F1
K1
(1− τ2)
]
∂τ1
=
∂
[
F1
K1
(1− τ2)
]
∂τ2
= 0
Under the alternative hypothesis of proﬁt shifting (τ1 − τ2 < b <∞, S > 0), the
reported average pre-tax proﬁtabilities are:
F1 − S
K1
=
1
a
F1K − S
K1
(A.9)
F2 + S
K2
=
1
a
F2K +
S
K2
=
1
a
F2K +
S
K1
K1
K2
(A.10)
Pre-tax proﬁtability in country 2 is higher than pre-tax proﬁtability in country
1 if:
F2 + S
K2
>
F1 − S
K1
⇔
1
a
F2K +
S
K1
K1
K2
>
1
a
F1K − S
K1
⇔
1
a
(F2K − F1K) > − S
K1
(
K1
K2
+ 1
)
⇔
F1K
a
(
F2K
F1K
− 1
)
> −τ1 − τ2
b
F1
K1
(
K1
K2
+ 1
)
⇔
1− τ1 + b2
(
S
F1
)2
1− τ2 − 1 > −
τ1 − τ2
b
(
K1
K2
+ 1
)
⇔
1− τ1 + b2
(
τ1−τ2
b
)2
1− τ2 +
τ1 − τ2
b
(
K1
K2
+ 1
)
> 1⇔
1
1− τ2 −
τ1
1− τ2 +
1
2b
(τ1 − τ2)2
1− τ2 +
τ1 − τ2
b
(
K1
K2
+ 1
)
> 1⇔
(τ1 − τ2)
[
1
2b
τ1 − τ2
1− τ2 +
1
b
(
K1
K2
+ 1
)]
>
τ1 − τ2
1− τ2 ⇔
τ1 − τ2
2b
+
1
b
(1− τ2)
(
K1
K2
+ 1
)
> 1 (A.11)
With regard to average reported post-tax proﬁtabilities of the two subsidiaries:
A.2
(1− τ2) F2 + S
K2
− (1− τ1) F1 − S
K1
> 0⇔
(1− τ2)
[
1
a
F2K +
S
K1
K1
K2
]
− (1− τ1)
[
1
a
F1K − S
K1
]
> 0⇔
r
a
− (1− τ1) r
a
1
1− τ1 + b2
(
S
F1
)2 + SK1
[
(1− τ2) K1
K2
+ (1− τ1)
]
> 0⇔
r
a
1− 1− τ1
1− τ1 + b2
(
S
F1
)2
+ S
K1
[
(1− τ2) K1
K2
+ (1− τ1)
]
> 0 (A.12)
Both terms of inequality (A.12) are positive and thus after-tax proﬁtability in
the low tax country 2 is unambiguously higher than in the high tax country, 1.
Passing on to comparative statics, we diﬀerentiate (A.9) with respect to the two
tax rates:
∂ F1−SK1
∂τ1
=
∂
[
1
aF1K − SK1
]
∂τ1
⇒
∂ F1−SK1
∂τ1
=
∂
[
1
aF1K − τ1−τ2b F1K1
]
∂τ1
⇒
∂ F1−SK1
∂τ1
=
∂
[
1
aF1K
(
1− τ1−τ2b
)]
∂τ1
⇒
∂ F1−SK1
∂τ1
=
r
a
∂
[
1
1−τ1+ 12b (τ1−τ2)2
(
1− τ1−τ2b
)]
∂τ1
⇒
∂ F1−SK1
∂τ1
=
r
a
∂
[
2(b−τ1+τ2)
2b(1−τ1)+(τ1−τ2)2
]
∂τ1
⇒
∂ F1−SK1
∂τ1
=
2r
a
[
−
(
2b (1− τ1) + (τ1 − τ2)2
)
− (b− τ1 + τ2) (−2b+ 2 (τ1 − τ2))
]
[
2b (1− τ1) + (τ1 − τ2)2
]2 ⇒
∂ F1−SK1
∂τ1
=
2r
[
2b (b− 1− τ1 + 2τ2) + (τ1 − τ2)2
]
a
[
2b (1− τ1) + (τ1 − τ2)2
]2 (A.13)
If costs of proﬁt shifting are not too high (b ⇒ (τ1 − τ2) it can be shown that
(A.13) will be unambiguously negative:
A.3
2r
[
2b (b− 1− τ1 + 2τ2) + (τ1 − τ2)2
]
a
[
2b (1− τ1) + (τ1 − τ2)2
]2 < 0⇔
2b (b− 1− τ1 + 2τ2) < − (τ1 − τ2)2 ⇒
2 (τ1 − τ2) (τ1 − τ2 − 1− τ1 + 2τ2) < − (τ1 − τ2)2 ⇒
2 (τ1 − τ2 − 1− τ1 + 2τ2) < − (τ1 − τ2)⇒
−2 (1− τ2) < − (τ1 − τ2)⇒
2 (1− τ2) > (τ1 − τ2)⇒
2 > (τ1 + τ2)
∂ F1−SK1
∂τ2
=
r
a
∂
[
2(b−τ1+τ2)
2b(1−τ1)+(τ1−τ2)2
]
∂τ2
⇒
∂ F1−SK1
∂τ2
=
2r
a
(
2b (1− τ1) + (τ1 − τ2)2
)
− (b− τ1 + τ2) (−2 (τ1 − τ2))[
2b (1− τ1) + (τ1 − τ2)2
]2 ⇒
∂ F1−SK1
∂τ2
=
2r
[
2b (1− τ2)− (τ1 − τ2)2
]
a
[
2b (1− τ1) + (τ1 − τ2)2
]2 (A.14)
As regards average reported after-tax proﬁtability of subsidiary 1:
∂
[
(1− τ1) F1−SK1
]
∂τ1
=
r
a
∂
[
2(b−τ1+τ2)(1−τ1)
2b(1−τ1)+(τ1−τ2)2
]
∂τ1
⇒
∂
[
(1− τ1) F1−SK1
]
∂τ1
=
2r
a
(−1− b− τ2 + 2τ1)
[
2b (1− τ1) + (τ1 − τ2)2
]
[
2b (1− τ1) + (τ1 − τ2)2
]2 +
2r
a
− (b− τ1 + τ2) (1− τ1) (−2b+ 2 (τ1 − τ2))[
2b (1− τ1) + (τ1 − τ2)2
]2
∂
[
(1− τ1) F1−SK1
]
∂τ1
= − 2r
a
[
2b (1− τ1) + (τ1 − τ2)2
]2
[
b (2− (2− τ1) τ1 − (2− τ2) τ2)− (1− τ2) (τ1 − τ2)2
]
(A.15)
A.4
∂
[
(1− τ1) F1−SK1
]
∂τ2
=
r
a
∂
[
2(b−τ1+τ2)(1−τ1)
2b(1−τ1)+(τ1−τ2)2
]
∂τ2
⇒
∂
[
(1− τ1) F1−SK1
]
∂τ2
=
2r
a
(1− τ1)
[
2b (1− τ1) + (τ1 − τ2)2
]
[
2b (1− τ1) + (τ1 − τ2)2
]2 +
2r
a
− (b− τ1 + τ2) (1− τ1) (−2 (τ1 − τ2))[
2b (1− τ1) + (τ1 − τ2)2
]2
∂
[
(1− τ1) F1−SK1
]
∂τ2
=
2r (1− τ1)
[
2b (1− τ2)− (τ1 − τ2)2
]
a
[
2b (1− τ1) + (τ1 − τ2)2
]2 (A.16)
With regard to equation (A.15), given that b > τ1 − τ2 then for the numerator
to be positive it suﬃces to prove that:
2− 2τ1 + τ21 − 2τ2 + τ22 > (1− τ2) (τ1 − τ2)⇒
2 (1− τ1) + τ21 − 2τ2 + τ22 > τ1 − τ2 − τ2τ1 + τ22 ⇒
2 (1− τ1) + τ21 − τ2 > τ1 − τ2τ1 ⇒
2 (1− τ1) > τ1 (1− τ1) + τ2 (1− τ1)⇒
2 > τ1 + τ2
which holds for any conceivable tax rates. Equally, in equation (A.16) the nu-
merator is positive since b > τ1 − τ2 and (1− τ2) > (τ1 − τ2).
In order to make progress with respect to the comparative statics of the reported
proﬁtability of subsidiary 2 one needs to solve for the ratio of K1/K2 using (A.3)-
(A.5) and substitute into (A.10). We, ﬁrstly, assume proﬁt functions of the form
Fi = AiK
a
i , where Ai is the total factor productivity for each of the subsidiaries.
Combinations of equations (A.3), (A.4) and (A.5) yield:
K1
K2
=
(
A1
A2
)1/1−a [1− τ1 + (τ1−τ2)22b
(1− τ2)
]1/1−a
Equation (A.10) then yields:
F2 + S
K2
=
r
a
 1
1− τ2 +
(
A1
A2
)1/1−a τ1 − τ2
b
[
1− τ1 + (τ1−τ2)
2
2b
]a/1−a
(1− τ2)1/1−a
 (A.17)
Diﬀerentiation of (A.17) with respect to τ1, τ2 yields:
A.5
∂ F2+SK2
∂τ1
=
r
ab (1− τ2)1/1−a
(
A1
A2
)1/1−a

[
1− τ1 + (τ1−τ2)
2
2b
]a/1−a
+
a(τ1−τ2)
1−a
[
1− τ1 + (τ1−τ2)
2
2b
] a
1−a−1 ( τ1−τ2
b − 1
)

∂ F2+SK2
∂τ1
=
r
ab (1− τ2)1/1−a
(
A1
A2
)1/1−a [
1− τ1 + (τ1 − τ2)
2
2b
]a/1−a
[
1 +
a (τ1 − τ2)
1− a
(
τ1 − τ2
b
− 1
)
1
1− τ1 + (τ1−τ2)
2
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Below are the partial derivatives of the average reported post-tax proﬁtability of
subsidiary 2 with respect to the tax rates:
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